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LUCRI CAUSA IN LARCENY
The necessity of the lueri causa to constitute the crime
of larceny,, has not yet undergone decision in Pennsylvania.
Instead of the usual article, therefore, we present this month
a decision which will be found to contain a trustworthy summary of the position taken in the various jurisdictions, in
respect to this subject.
COMMONWEALTH V. BEYLA.
Larceny-Motive for Taklng-Lucri Causa not an Essential
Element
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Beyla took Cool's horse from his (Cool's) stable without the consent
of the owner. After leading the horse about a mile, killed it.
dictment for larceny.
DIPPLE for Commonwealth.
LONG for Defendant.

In-

OPINION OF THE COURT.
PARSONS J.-The question before the court is, can an indictment
for larceny be sustained against against Beyla? In determining this point
there are several preliminary questions that need our consideration..
First Is lucri causa an essential element of the crime of larceny in
Pennsylvania?
Second. If so, was there sufficient benefit derived in this case by the
defendant to constitute the crime?
In answer to the first question, we are of the opinion that the felony
of larceny cannot be committed unless there is some beneft to be derived
261
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by the one committing the crime. In many states there are statutes defining what shall be termed larceny, but unfortunately there is none such
in Pennsylvania, and in the absence of such a statutory definition
the proper and only logical place to look for our definition is to the old
common law and the term as it has been construed in the cases within
this Commonweal h. At common law larceny was defined to be "the
wrongful and fraudulent taking and carrying away, by any person, of
the personal goods of another, from any place, without any color of
right, with afelonious intent to convert them to the taekr's own use, and
make them his own property, without the consent and against thewill ofthe real owner."
(This definition has been approved by the American
and English Encyc. of Law.) This book further says: "The question
whether in order to constitute larceny, there must be an intent on the
part of the taker to appropriate the goods to his own use, has been and
still is the subject of conflicting decisions. The preponderance of authority is to the effect that such intent is necessary." There are a long line
of decisions in various states supporting the view here taken. United
States v. Durkee held that the lucri cause is an essential element and
goes so far as to severely criticize the opposite doctrine. New York decisions are unanimous in holding this same view.
Wharton in his Work on Criminal Lawsays "Wenow approach a subject as to which there has been a conflict of authority both ancient and
modern. The English common law undoubtedly accepted the theory that
lucri causa was an essential and we have undoubtedly accepted the
English common law. The qualification, lucri causa, was a part of most
of the old definitions of larceny, and repeatedly it was decided that unless
a taking was with the expectation of advantage to the taker it was not
larceny. True lucri causa is explained in a broad sense, but nevertheless it was regarded that it, in some shape, was necessary."
In the United States the line between larceny and malicious mischief,
is well marked. Thus, it has frequently been held a misdemeanor of the
nature of malicious mischief to kill an animal belonging to another,
though it has never been held larceny so to kill, unless some benefit was
expected to the taker. Legislatures of different States have statutes
which provide somewhat as follows: "Injuring goods of another, without
expectation of benefit to self, shall be one offence, called malicious mischief, and shall be a misdemeaner and subject to a light punishment;
while taking goods of another, in order to benefit self, shall be another
offense, called larceny, which shall be a felony, and infamous and subject to a heavy punishment."
We see two glaring objections to the theory that lucri causa be not
made an essential to larceny-first, we level felonies down to the grade
of trespass, which in itself is enough reason for holding otherwise; secondly, we give a stimulus to peculation by visiting appropriation to self
with the same penalty asthat assigned to mere wanton injuryto another's
goods. "Thus we not only brutalize the public mind by doing away with
the distinction between the various phases of guilt, but we give a preIn such cases the wrong
mium to desperate remunerate criminalty."
doer's logic would be, "If I am to be punished all the same, I am to be
punished for something that will pay."
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Then too, in an old Pennsylvania case 1 Dallas 335, Reapublica v.
Teischer, whose doctrine has never been repudiated, where one was
indicted for "maliciously, wilfully and wickedly killing a horse," the
prisoner was found guilty of malieious mischief and the court held that,
"in order that the crime be larceny there must be some intent to convert
the thing to the wrongdoer's own use, or that he derive some benefit
therefrom."
In 2 Parsons 385 Judge Parsons says "It may not be amiss on this
occasion, to refer to first principles. Larceny, by an eminent writer,
has been defined to be, the wrongful or fraudulent taking and conveying
away by any person of the mere personal goods of another from any
place, with a felonious intent to convert them to his (the taker's) use,
and make them his own property without the consent of the owner."
By another learned judge it was called "the felonious taking of the personal property of another without his consent, and against his will, with
an intention to convert it to the use of the taker. This latter I consider
the more concise and better definition." Here it is plainly seen that this
eminent jurist considers the lucri causa an essential element to larceny, at
least in Pennsylvania.
Secondly. Was there sufficient benefit derived to constitute the crime
larceny? We are compelled to answer this point in the negative.
"The intention to take what is known to be the property of another
and when the taking is known to be against his will, is not sufficient to
make the taking larceny. The thing might be taken in order maliciously
to destroy it. "-Trickett v. Penna. Criminal Law page 19. Again in 1
Phila. 146, the court says "When one carries off the property of another
the presumption is that he intended to steal it, but that presumption may
be repelled by the circumstances." Here the circumstances surely indicate the intention. The killing, without even riding the horse, surely
repels the idea of theft. Again had there been a crime committed and
the horse led away and killed so as to prevent a more easy following, there
would undoubtedly be such a conversion as the law contemplates, but all
such ideas are utterly opposed to the facts of this case.
"According to the rule that the lucri causa is an essential element
of larceny, it is held that taking and carrying away the goods of another
merely for the purpose of destroying them in a spirit of wantoness, or for
the gratification of malice against the owner, does not constitute larceny,
though it may constitute another crime (The New York decisions are
unanimous in this proposition). This case must be distinguished from a
party acting with a design of producing a result which would be a benefit
directly or indirectly to him or to some other person, and not merely in a
spirit of wantoness or revenge. "-American and English Ency. of Law.
We show no hesitancy, therefore, in saying that the Pennsylvania
law -is clearly settled on the point and that the Commonwealth's indictment must fail. The facts of the case clearly show that the only possible
gain that the defendant could have had was the gratification of malice,
or revenge, and such a benefit is surely not within the contemplation of the
law. The removal was merely nominal and the motive was that of injury
to the owner, and not of benefit to the taker. The offence is scarcely distinguishable from that of malicious mischief, and therefore belongs to a
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different branch of criminal jurisprudence. The worthy counsel for the
commonwealth has cited several cases in support of his proposition, but
at a glance they are seen to be entirely off point.
We therefore find for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The question presented is whether a wrougful taking of property,
with the intent at the time of the taking subsequently to destroy the
property taken, is larceny; or whether, in other words, in order to constitute larceny the wrongful taking must be with intent to benefit the
person who takes it, lucri causa. The expression lucri causa is borrowed
from the civil law which defined larceny as follows: "Furtum est contrectatio fraudulosa lucrifaciendi gratia,vel epsius rei vel etiam usus
ejus possessionisve quod lege naturali prohibitum est admittere." Inst.
IV 1.
The first definition of larceny at common law is that of Bracton.
"Furtum est secundum leges contrectatio rei. alienae fraudulenta, cum
animo furandi, invito illo cujus res illa fuerit."-Bracton II, 508.
It is a matter of considerable significance that Bracton, who borrowed
so largely from the civil law, omitted from his definition the expression
"lucri faciendi gratia."
Lord Coke's definition does not include the idea of lucri causa nor
does the definition contained in the Mirror for Magistrates.-Inst. 107.
Roscoe's Criminal Evidence 644; 2 Archibold Crim. Pl. and Pr. 389-342;
Hawkins P. C. 89; Stephens Criminal Law 227 Hale P. C., are to the
same effect.
Blackstone says that "felonious" means "done animo furandi or as
the civil law expresses it lucri causa."-4 B1. Com. 232 citing Inst. 4, 1, 1.
The passage cited by Blackstone as authority for the phrase lucri causa
does not contain these words, or words similar. On the contrary, theft
is, in that passage defined as the fraudulent dealing with a thing,
and nothing is said about dealing with it for the sake of gain. Another
passage, however, seems to include in its definition, gain to the taker.(Dig. 47, 213.) Blackstone is the first writer who introduces the words
lucri .causa into the common law definition of larceny.
Lucri causa seems also to be an essential element of larceny as defined by the code Napoleon, the North German Code, and by the codes of
Saxony, Bavaria, Austria and Wurtemburg.
An examination of the English cases discovers a considerable conflict of authority In Rex v. Blyton In. Sess. 226 (1791) it was held that
a servant who took articles of furniture and threw them into a river as
revenge for a supposed affront and with no intention of converting them
to his own use was not guilty of larceny.
On the other hand, in Regina v. Cabbage R. & P. 292 Beale 682 (1815)
a majority of the court held that lucri causa was not an essential element
of larceny. Some of the majority thought that there was a sufficient
lucri causa even if it was regarded as an essential element.
Regina v. Morfit R. & R. 307 (1816) Beale 683 is also an authority
for the proposition that lucri causa is not an essential element, though
here too it was alleged by some of the judges that there was a lucri causa.
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Regina v. Godfrey, 8 Car. & P. 563, (1837) decides that lucri causa is
an essential element. On the other hand, in Regina v. Grincell 9 Car.
& P. 365 (1839) a conviction for larceny was sustained tho no lucri causa
appeared.
In Reg. v. White, 9 Car. & P. 314 (1840) a servant who took property
with intent to give it away was held guilty of larceny. In the opinion
the court said that the purpose for which the servant took the property
was immaterial.
Regina v. Handley, C. & Mar. 547 (1842) is similar to Regina v. Morfit and was decided in the same manner. In these cases it was decided
that a serva, t who clandestinely takes grain belonging to his master to
feed to the master's horses, commits a larceny of the grain. In the first
case it was held by a majority of the judges that the purpose to which
the servant intended to apply the grain was immaterial. It was, however, alleged by some of the judges that the additional quantity of grain
taken would diminish the work of the men, who had to look after the
horses, so that the lucri causa, to give themselves ease, was an ingredient
in the case.
In a later case Regina v. Privett, 1 Den. C. C. 193, Mickell 814 (1846)
it appeared that the prisoner took oats for the purpose of giving them to
his master's horses and that he was not answerable at all for the condition or appearance of the horses. A conviction for larceny was sustained
by a majority of the court holding that "it made no difference that the
In Reginav. Jones 2 Car. & K., 818 Micktaking was not lucri causa."
ell 818, (1846) a servant woman who intercepted and burned a letter to
suppress inquiries it might suggest concerning her character was held
guilty of larceny. The questions suggested by some of the judges in this
case indicate that they thought a lucri causa unnecessary.
In Regina v. Wynne, 1 Den C. C. 363 (1848) a post office clerk who
secreted a letter in order to avoid a penalty attached to a mistake he
had made concerning it was held guilty of larceny. Though there probably was in this case a lucri causa, the words of Lord Duncan indicate that
he thought an intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property sufficient.
In Regina v. Barley L. R. C. C. 347 (1872) it is said that the taking
must be lucri causa but the court evidently merely meant that the taking
the must be with intent to deprive owner permanently of his property, for
it said "It was no more stealing than it would be to take a stick out of a
man's hand to beat him with it."
Turning to the text writers we find a difference of opinion as to what
the rule in England is. The Am. and Eng. Ency. states that the English cases settle the rule in England, as requiring the lucri causa. An
examination of the cases cited shows that they do not sustain the doctrine of the text. The remarks of Eyre in Rex v. Pear, 2 East P. C.,
685 (1779) were dicta. The question of lucri causa was not involved. In
Regina v. Holloway 2 Cox C. C., 241 the question of lucri causa was not
involved. The same is true of Rex v. Van Meyere R. & P. 18. Regina
v. Godfrey, 8 C. and P. 563 sustains the text.
In regard to the English rule Bishop says, "The English court. however, seem at last to have utterly overthrown the old doctrine of lucri
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causa." 846. "To this day," says Stephen, "it is a part of the law of this
country, as settled by very modern cases that the motives which lead a
Even Wharton, the most enthuman to commit crime are immaterial."
siastic exponent of the lucri causa doctrine, admits that the trend of the
English cases are against it.
The learned court below has placed reliance upon the statements of
Mr. Wharton who expresses the opinion that the American cases sustain
the doctrine of lucri causa. An examination proves this opinion to
be incorrect. Wharton cites in support of his view Resp. v. Teischer
1 Dall. 335. This case has nothing to do with larceny. It merely holds
that the malicious killing of a horse is indictable. No suggestion is made
that the horse was ever taken from the owner and nothing is said as to
larceny. He also cites McDaniel v. State 19 Miss. 401. This '€as a murder case. In the course of the opinion a definition of larceny is incidentally given but there was no attempt to define it accurately. A subsequent case, Hamillon v. State, 35 Miss. 214 holds that a lucri causa is not
necessary. He also cites State v. Hawkins 17 Ala. 461 which held that
taking a slave in order to set her free was not larceny. It is sufficient to
say that the doctrine for which this case is cited by Wharton has been
overruled in the very state in which it was deci led, William v. State 32
Ala. 411. He also cites U. S. v. Durkee, 1 McAll. 196 where the accused
took muskets to prevent their being used upon himself and a conviction
was denied on the ground of want of lucri causa. In regard to this case
Bishop well says, "A better reason for a just decision would have been
that his intent was not to deprive the owner of his ownership therein."
These are the only cases referred to by
2 Bis. New Crim. L. § 847.
Wharton for the purpose of showing that the decisions in this country
sustain the doctrine of lucri causa.
The learned court below has also placed reliance upon the statement
of the Amer. and Eng. Ency. to the effect that the preponderance of authority is to the effect that a lucri causa is necessary. Let us examine
briefly the authorities cited in support of the statement.
State v. Fenn 41 Conn. 590 merely decides that to constitute larceny
the taking need not be private or secret. The lower court defines larceny
as involviug a lucri causa, but the question of lucri causa was not involved.
Keely v. State 14 Ind. 36, holds that "there may be larceny without
anticipated benefit to the thief." Pence v. State, 110 Ind, 93 supports
the doctrine for which it is cited, holding that a taking with intent to
destroy is not larceny. But in a later Indiana case, Best v. State 57 N.
E. 534 it is held that "it is not necessary to constitute larceny that the
taker should have intended to appropriate the property taken to his own
use."
Witt v. State, 9 Mo. 671 and State v. Conway 18 Mo. 321 do not decide that a lucri causa is necessary. The remarks of the court in each
case were mere dicta. In neither case was the question of lucri causa
involved. A later case, State v. Lithell 170 Mo. 13, 90 S. W 143, does
hold that an intent to convert to the taker'" use is necessary.
The opinion in Fields v. State, 6 Cold 526 uses the words lucri causa
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but taking the opinion as a whole it is an authority against rather than
for the doctrine for which it was cited.
In Blunt v. Com. 4 Leigh, 688 thee is a dictum to the effect that an
intent to convert to the taker's use is necessary, and in a later case, Vaugh
v. Com. 10 Gratt 758, it is held that a lucri causa is necessary, but a still
later case, Jerdon v. Com. 23 Gratt 943, holds that "it is not essential
that the person taking shall intend to convert to his own use. It is sufficient that his purpose is to deprive the owner wholly of them, for although
a taking lucri causa is larceny a taking in order to deprive the owner of
his property is equally so."
State v. Hawkins, 8 Port. (Ala.) 461 is overruled in Williams v. State
52 Ala. 411. The English cases cited and U. S. v. Dinkee have already
been examined.
State v. Haws 2 Harr. (DA.) 529, Suthran v. Territory 8 Okla. 499 and
and the Texas cases sustain the doctrain of the text though the rule in Texas
as has been rendered doubtful by the recent decision in Lopez v. State,
80 S. W. 66. People v. Woodward, 31 Hun. (N. Y.) 37 sustains the
doctrine of the text. In this case there was an exhaustive dissenting
opinion by one of the three judges nd no authorities are cited in support
of the majority opinion except Wharton's Criminal Law.
The following cases decide that a lucri causa is not an essential element of larceny:
People v. Juarez 28 Cal. 380; Hamilton v. State; 35 Miss. 214; Warden v. State, 60 Miss; Delk v. State, 64 Miss. 77; State v. McKee 17
Utah 370, 53 Pac. 733. State v. Cradle, 35 W. Va. 73; 12 S. E. 1098;
Williams v. State, 52 Ala. 411; Jordon v. Com. 30 Gratt 943; State v.
Davis 38 N. J. L. 177 (Dictum). Best v. State (Ind.) 57, N. E. 534.
Shingerland v. State, 19 Nev. 135; State v. Brown, 3 Scob. 508.
This review of the authorities convinces this court that the overwhelming weight of authority, English and American, early and recent,
judicial and non-judicial, supports the doctrine that a lucri causa is not
an essential element of larceny, and that the cases which have proceeded
upon the ground that a lucri causa is necessary have given a very vague
and ridiculously extensive meaning to the term lucrum.
The entire law of larceny is so very technical as to render almost
hopeless any attempt to settle a disputed point by an appeal to principle.
Still, if in absence of decision in our own state, we are not to be
guided by the authorities cited; and are to consider the question on
principle, the same conclusion would follow. The following considerations suggest themselves:
(1) The doctrine that a lucri causa is an essential ingredient of larceny makes motive an essential element of criminality. To make motive
the test of criminality is always popular but is open to the following two
objections: (1) The great object of the criminal law is to prevent certain
acts injurious to society and the mischief depends upon the intention and
not upon the motive of the agent. (2) It is impossible to determine with
precision what a man's motives were.
(2) If lucri causa is required this is placing greed as a base motive
pre-eminent over all base motives, but, in reason, there are other evil
motives as deserving of punishment as greed.
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(3) The purpose of the law of larceny is to secure a man's property
to him and this purpose is carried out by punishing the thief for wrongfully depriving the owner of it rather than for the wrongful gain he has
made by the theft. The invasion of one's property right is the same
wlhether the thief was actuated by false philanthropy or a desire for private gain.
(4) Theoretically, at least, acts are punished because injurious to
society and surely the injury to society is greater when property is taken
and destroyed than when it is taken and used.
The reasons advanced by Wharton are not convincing. There is
nothing sacred about the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors.
It is admitted that the distinction rests upon no rational basis. The second reason advanced by Wharton is too absurd to deserve consideration.
In reversing the decision of the court below we feel constrained to
say that his error was very probably in a large measure due to the inadequate presentation of the case for the commonwealth.
Judgment reversed.

HENRY FREEMAN V. B. & D. RY. CO.
Trespass for Personal Injuries-Alighting from Moving Freight

Train-Contributory Negligence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Freeman desired to get from Rexville, Tenn., to the place where he
worked, Newton, Tenn., on the night of February 22, 1909. There were
no more passenger trains that day, but a freight train of the defendant
company, which stopped at Rexville, passed through Newton. Accordingly Freeman tried to induce the engineer of this train to let him ride
on the engine from Rexville to Newton. He finally was given permission after paying the engineer fifty cents therefor. However the engineer only agreed to slow down at Newton so that Freeman could jump off
there, the train not having occasion to stop there. Upon nearing the
place Freeman got down on the step and the engine slackened speed.
Freeman, hearing the engineer say something about jumping, leaped
while the train was going twelve miles an hour. The engineer had
intended to slow down to six miles, and what he actually said was for
Freeman not to jump yet, though Freeman thought it was a direction to
jump.
In jumping Freeman fell and his foot was run over, mashing two
toes. He sued the company for this injury. There does not appear to
have been a rule forbidding engineers to allow persons to ride on the
engines, but it was proved that no freight trains carried passengers.
The lower court charged the jury to the effect that if Freeman was on
the engine with the permission of the engineer the Company was bound
to exercise toward him the same degree of care that it owes to passengers. Verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff. The above
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indicated portion of the charge was alleged as error in an appeal.
suit had been refused. This was also alleged as error.
WANNER for Plaintiff.
WOODWARD for Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
BRANCH, J.-Was plaintiff a passenger on defendant's road? The
decision of this court does not turn on the answer to this question; but,
as the trial court has in substance said that he was, we will first dispose
of it. A passenger has been said to be "one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of a contract, express or implied, with the carriers,
as to the payment of fare, or that which is accepted as an equivalent
therefor. "-5 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, 486. If there was such a contract between the parties hereto, it could have been entered into, on the
part of defendant, only by its properly authorized agent. And we think
that the engine driver was not authorized by either express or implied
authority to bind the defendant by such a contract. We take judicial
notice of the fact that the person ordinarily in charge of a railroad train
is the conductor, the duty of the engineer being to control the movements
of the train according to the law of the road, the rules of his employer,
and the directions of the conductor.
When railroad companies divide their business into freight and passenger business, such division is notice that those in charge of freight
trains cannot accept persons as passengers unless the contract is expressly shown. Eaton v. R. R. Co., 57 N. Y. 382, This defendant had
made such a division, and we find no evidence to warrant an assertion
that the persons in charge of defendant's freight trains could accept persons as passengers. The mere absence of a rule forbidding engineers to
allow persons to ride on the engines does not overcome the presumption,
in fact the presumption is not even weakened thereby; but it certainly
is strengthened by the fact that no freight trains carried passengers.
"Where a person goes upon a freight train charged with knowledge
by reason of the general course of business of the carrier, or by reason
of rules and regulations known to him, that passengers are not allowed
to ride on freight trains, and that conductors of freight trains have no
authority to allow them to do so, he does not become a passenger, although
he may have the assent of the conductor to the act, and even though the
conductor accepts a ticket or payment of fare," 6 Cyc. 540. Here the
facts that defendant company provided passenger trains for carriage over
the route taken by Freeman and that no freight trains of defendant carried passengers were sufficient to charge the plaintiff with a duty to
inquire, and that duty was not discharged by application to and acceptance by the engineer. "The ordinary business of conducting and managing a freight train does not involve any right to invite persons to ride
upon such trains, or to accept them as passengers."
Powers v. R. R.,
153 Mass., 188. In this last case it was sought by plaintiff to show that
defendant's conductors could receive persons as passengers on freight
trains, by showing that conductors had been so doing for a considerable
time previous, but the court said, "But in order that the corporation
should be made responsible by reason of such custom, it was necessary
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to show that it was actually known to the officials who conducted its business, or that it was so general and of such duration that it must be fairly
inferred that it was known and assented to by them." The evidence in
this case, shows that defendant's freight trains did not carry passengers,
so that defendant is not confronted by any such custom.
Even if the conductor had authority to take persons on freight trains
as passengars, in the absence of express authority or authority from tolerated custom, no other members of the crew would have authority to
bind defendant by a contract of carriage. The rule is well stated in 6
Cyc. 541 to be that "Persons accepting invitations from employes not
having the control of the train or any apparent right to give permission
to ride thereon, such as brakemen, engineers, yardmaster or baggagemen, are of course not entitled to be considered as passengers."
Had the plaintiff been riding on the engine with the assent of the
conductor of the train it would take special circumstances to convince us
that this was allowed by defendant. No place on the train would be less
likely to be used as a place for a passenger to ride. Those who work on
the engine must give their undivided attention to their duty. Not only
the interests of the railroad company make it unlikely that defendant
would allow a passenger to be carried on the locomotive, but the interests
of the public as well. "One on a car, as a freight car, not designed for'
passengers, (and surely the engine of a freight train is not so designed) is
presumed by law not to be a passenger, and it takes special circumstances to rebut this presumption."
5 A. and E. Ency. of Law, 488.
See also 6 Cyc 541, note 39. As t9 the right of an engineer to take one on
the engine as a passenger see 33 Cyc. 862, note and5 Am. and Eng. Encyc.
of Law 511, note. The latter says, "The permission of the engine-driver
to a person to ride upon the engine is not the permission of the Company,
he having no power to give such permission, and such person is not a
passenger on the train."
See also Files v. R. R., 149 Mass., 204.
We think it clear that plaintiff was not a passenger on defendant's
road. He has not shown us that the engineman had the authority to
make him such, though the burden was on the plaintiff to do so. The
engineer did not accept plaintiff's offer at once as he would be likely to
have done had he the authority contended for. The payment to the engineer of fifty cents did not make plaintiff a passenger, and, as to that, it
does not appear that the money was ever received by the defendant. No
doubt receipt of the money by defendant, if the defendant had knowledge, express or implied, of the source of the money, would have been a
ratification by defendant of its servant's act. Nor do we think that the
mere absefice of a rule prohibiting the carriage of persons on engines
any indication that the engineer had power to take plaintiff on the engine. The railroads of this country employ a multitude of men. Any
one of these men could do a thousand and one things that are not expressly forbidden by their employers; but because the railroad companies
have not ruled against the doing of these acts, does the failure to so rule
place the property of the railroads at the very whim of the employees?
Most assuredly not. The charge was error.
2. Should plaintiff have been non-suited? The answer thereto will
depend on whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
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gence in jumping from the engine while traveling at a high rate of speed.
We find many cases in which this question was left to the jury, and
we will examine a few of them. In Penna. R. R. Co. v. Lyon, 129 Pa.
113, it is said, per McCollum, J.. "When he (the passenger) leaves the
train while it is in motion, by direction of the company's agent, it is for
the jury to say, upon the evidence, whether the act was negligence or
not". But this statement is broader than was warranted by the facts.
In this last cited case, if plaintiff did leave the train while it was in motion, he left it after it had stopped for an instant at the station at which
he was to alight, and the question was whether it had stopped long
enough to allow plaintiff to get off. And it seems to have been conceded
that, even if the train had not stopped long enough to allow the plaintiff
to get off, he should not have jumped off unless the speed was slight.
In Canal Co. v. Webster, 18 W. N. C, 439, the plaintiff was injured while
alighting from a moving car on the defendant's railroad. The speed of
the car was not beyond the ordinary gait of a man. It was not clear
from the evidence whether the conductor had directed the plaintiff to get
off or had told him to stay on. The question of the plaintiff's negligence
was for the jury. In R. R. Co. v. Peters, 116 Pa., 206, the plaintiff was
hurt while alighting from a moving train of defendant, but it was not
contributory negligence per se to so alight, for the train had stopped and
then had started just as the plaintiff was about to step off. The same
was true in R, R. Co. v. Kilgore 32 Pa. 292.
But our case is not similar. In no case above had the cars attained
a high rate of speed. The general rule that it is per se contributory
negligence to get on or off a moving train, Powelson v. Traction Co., 204
Pa. 474; Hunterson v. Traction Co., 205 Pa. 598; Boulfrois v. Traction
Co., 210 Pa. 263; Jagger v. Ry, Co., 180 Pa. 336, remains unshaken by
the above decisions. Had the plaintiff been thrown from the engine,
after he had taken his place on the ladder, by the motion of the engine he
could not recover, Bainbridge v. Tradtion Co., 206 Pa. 71, and it is difficult to see how he can recover when he was thrown from the engine by
his own motion. Even had the engineer directed the plaintiff to get off,
the plaintiff would not have been excused for jumping when the speed
was twelve miles per hour. In Jagger v. R. R., supra, the plaintiff
had an arrangement, established by custom, with those in charge of defendant's cars whereby the cars would not be stopped for the plaintiff to
get off but would slow down to four or five miles per hour. Plaintiff was
injured in thus getting off, but was non-suited. In Hagan v. R. R. Co.,
10 W. N. C., 360 it was held that, while defendant's conductor was guilty
of negligence in not stopping the car when requested by the plaintiff,
nevertheless plaintiff could not recover for injuries received by alighting
from the car while in motion. In R. R. Co. v. Aspell, as defendant's
train approached Morgan's station where the plaintiff was to get off an
employee of defendant called out the station. The engineer, however,
failed to stop at the station, whereupon the plaintiff jumped off and was
injured. This was contributory negligence per se.
It seems clear that the plaintiff's act in jumping from a train going
so fast was inexcusable. The fact that he misunderstood the directions
of the engineer does not avail him, because the speed of the train was so
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great that he would have been justified in getting off only when compelled to by superior foece, applied or immediately pending.
For these reasons the judgment below is reversed and judgment is
entered for the defendant. In so doing we are not unmindful of the fact
that refusal to non-suit is not assignable as error, Faston v. Neff, 102
Pa. 474 and Crawford v. McKinney, 165 Pa. 605, but we have assumed
that the case is here for a disposal on its merits, and we treat it as if a
point for binding instructions had been presented by defendant and refused.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
Freeman was not entitled to the rights of a passenger. Railroads
are carriers both of goods and passengers, and while they may undertake
to carry both on the same train, they are not compelled to, but may lawfully divide the traffic, furnishing separate trains for each, and, having
done so, may lawfully refuse to carry passengers on their freight trains.
Where a company has so divided its traffic, the presumption will be that
the person who was riding on one of its freight trains was not legally a
passenger, and the burden of proof will be on him to show that under the
special circumstances of the case he occupied the relation of passenger.
Purple v. R. R. 114 Fed. 123; Smith v. R. R. 124 Ind. 395; Eaton v. R. R.
57 N. Y. 382.
In absence of any rule or established custom permitting passengers
to ride on freight trains, the presumption will be that those in charge of
such trains have no authority to authorize passengers to ride upon them.
Dysert v. R. R. 122 Fed. 228.
It is true that it has been held by some courts that where a person
offers himself as a passenger upon a freight train without knowledge
that the company refuses to receive passengers upon it, he will be justified in relying upon the authority of the conductor in charge of that train,
and if such conductor receives him' as a passenger he will be lawfully
such, but it has also been held that though such person may lawfully rely
upon the authority of the conductor, he has no right to rely upon the authority of a brakeman or other inferior servant when a conductor is in
charge of the train. Candiff v. Railroad Co. 42 La.Ann. 477; Reary v.
Railway 40 La. Ann. 33; Brerig v. Railway 64 Minn. 168; McNamara v.
R. R., 61 Minn. 296. It has also been held that the implied authority of
the conductor can go no farther than to receive him as a passenger in that
part of the train upon which passengers might properly be expected to
be carried, and he cannot claim the rights of a passenger when he accepts carriage elsewhere, as upon the engine attached to the train. Files
v. R. R. 149 Mass. 204; Woolsey v. R. R. 39 Neb. 798; Railroad v. Michie
83 Ill. 427; and see Stringer v. R. R. 96 Mo. 299; Radley v. R. R., 44
Ore. 332; R. R. v. Boyle 101 Tenn. 40; Sheets v. Railroad 78 N. Y. Supp.
729; 178 N. Y., 553.
The application of these authorities to the present case is evident,
and in connection with the opinion of the learned judge of the Superior
Court, convinces this court that Freeman was not entitled to the rights
of a passenger.
The. Superior Court was right in deciding that Freeman was guilty of
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contributory negligence. In a number of very recent cases it has been
held that to step on or off a moving car, whether the power which propels the car be steam or electricity, is per se negligence and if injury
results to the passenger he cannot recover. To this rule there are some
rare exceptions, but where one is injured while getting on or off a moving car the burden is upon him to clearly demonstrate to the court why
the case should go to the jury as a rare exception to the rule. Hunterson v. Trac. Co. 205, Pa. 568; Powelson v. Trac. Co., 204 Pa. 474; Boulfrois v. Trac. Co. 210 Pa. 265; Bainbridge v. Trac. Co., 206 Pa. 71.
The question to be settled is whether the present case is one of the
rare exceptions to the rule. We do not think that it is. In Jagger v.
Ry: Co. 180 Pa. 438 it is held that to justify such action the motion of
the car must be so inconsiderable that a person of reasonable prudence,
exercising ordinary care, would not hesitate about jumping off, and that
"if the evidence leaves the question whether the car was fairly in motion in doubt, then the question of contributory negligence must go to the
jury. If it does not, it is a question of law." In this case it was held
contributory negligence as a matter of law, to jump from a car going at
the rate of 4 to 5 miles an hour though the jump was made with the knowledge and acquiescence of the conductor and motorman. It *will be observed that in this case the court said that if there was a doubt as to
wthether the car was "fairly in motion" the question was for the jury,
but if there was no such doubt the question was for the court. There is
no doubt that a train going at the rate of 12 miles an hour ibfairly in
motion and therefore in this case the question was for the court.
In Rothstein v. P. R. R., 171 Pa. 620, it was held as a matter of law,
that the negligence of a railroad company which leads a passenger to get
upon a wrong train is no warrant or excuse for his jumping from the
train while it is moving at the rate of from 10 to 15 miles an hour even
though one of the train men tells him that he is on the wrong train, that
it will not stop to let him off, and that it is going slow and he can jump
it. This case is very much like the case at bar.
We do not think that in the light of these cases and those cited in
the opinion of the Superior Court it can be said that the plaintiff has
"clearly demonstrated" to the court that the case should go to the jury as
a "rare exception" to the general rule. See especially Hutchinson.on
Carriers, sec. 1177-80.
It is true as stated in the opinion of the Superior Court that the
refusal to non-suit is not assignable as error. The case must however be
reversed because of the instruction that the plaintiff was entitled to
the rights of a passenger. When a case is reversed because of error committed at the trial a new venire will in general be granted but such
granting is not of course. The exercise by the Supreme Court of the
power to award a venire facies de novo in cases of reversal is controlled
by the character of the case and the sound discretion of the court. Fries
v. P. R. R. 98 Pa. 142. "Although it may be considered a general rule
that this court in a writ of error sued out by either plaintiff or defendant,
will grant a venire de novo whenever the judgment below is reversed for
an error committed in the course of a trial; yet, as an exception to this
rule, it must be understood that it will not be done where it appears from
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the plaintiff's own showing that he has no cause of action to try." 'Griffith v. Eshelman 4 Watts, 58; Ebersole v. Kingh, 5 Binn. 51.
"It is a general rule that where the facts of the case are determined
and are not in dispute and the only error lies on the application of the
law, the appellate court, on reversing the judgment, need not remand the
case for a new trial, but may itself render the proper judgment, or direct
the lower court to render it. "-3 Cyc. 451.
"Where, on appeal, from judgment in favor of plaintiff, the appellate
court decides that the plaintiff has no cause of action and cannot succeed
on another trial, it will not order a new trial on reversing judgment, but
will itself render the proper judgment, or order it rendered by the court
below."--3 Cyc. 452.
Further discussion of the questions involved is rendered unnecessary
by the very exhaustive discussion contained in the brief of the counsel
for the defendant, and the opinion of the learned judge of the Superior
Court.
Judgment affirmed

BOYD V. McLAUGHLIN.
Contract-Agreement With Third Party to do That for Which
One Is Already Bound -Consideration.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
McLaughlin was a merchant in the town of Y. Boyd was about to
move his business, which employed a large number of men, to the town
of Z when the Board of Trade in the town of X offered him a free site
for his mills, if he would agree to start his business in the town of X.
After agreeing to do so, Boyd told McLaughlin that he was in doubt as
to what he would do and McLaughlin then promised Boyd $1000 if he
would come to the town of X. Boyd came to X. Thisis assumpsit for the
$1000.
JACKSON for Plaintiff
STRAUSS for Defendant
OPINION OF THE COURT.
DAY, J.-To dispose of this case the court must determine whether
or not there was a valid contract existing between Boyd and McLaughlin.
There is no dispute as to McLaughlin's offer and to the fact that
Boyd accepted it by an act, viz, by moving his plant to X. This ordinarily would create a valid contract, but in the case before us we find that
Boyd was already under contract with the Board of Trade, to move his
business to X, and in view of this fact we must determine whether there
was any consideration to support McLaughlin's promise to pay $1000.
Would a promise made by Boyd to McLaughlin to induce him to do
what he has already bound to do under the original contract be binding,
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or would it be void for want of consideration; as Boyd gave him nothing
for his promise?
On this point there seem to be two different views taken by the
courts. In Massachusetts the courts hold that when parties contract
they are entitled to choose between going on with their agreement, or
refusing to perform and paying damages for the breach. And theyhold that
a promise to do what one is already under contract to perform is a good
cons deration for a second contract, as the party waives his right to elect
and binds himself to another party, by a second contract to perform
the original.-Munroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. Massachusetts 298; Rollins v.
Marsh, 128 Massachusetts 116. The Massachusetts, rule is followed in
many other states. See 9 Cyc. 851.
Other courts take the view that when a man makes a contract he
does so with the intention of performing it and with the expectation of
performance by the other party, and hold that a contract is something more
than a gambling transaction-a mere bet on its performance; and a
promise to do what one is already under contract to perform is no consideration for a new promise.-91 N. Y. 392 ; 25 Ind. 328 ; 69 Pa. 216 ; 52
Iowa 478.
In Moyer v. Kirby, 2 Psarson (Pa) 64, "B" agreed in writing to
erect and furnish a house for "A" before a certain day. Before the
work was completed the house was blown down, and "A" promised "B"
an additional sum for rebuilding it. In an action against "A" on the
promise, the court held it was without consideration, as the contractor
was bound by the first agreement to complete the house.
The promise of a person to carry out a subsisting contract with the
promise, or the performance of such contractual duty, is no consideration,
as he is doing no more than he was already bound to d) and hence has
sustained no detriment nor has the other party to the contract obtained
any benefit. This rule has been recognized and affirmed in the following
Pennsylvania cases: Wimer v. Worth Township Oversees of the Poor,
104 Pa. 320; Robb v. Mann, 11 Pa. 300; Cleaver v. Lenhart, 182 Pa. 285;
69 Pa. 216; 3 P. & W. 282; M:yer v. Kirby, 2 Pearson 64.
From these cases we think it is clear that had the Board of Trade of
X made a second agreement with Boyd to pay him $1,000 to come to X it
would have been without consideration and the courts would not have
enforced it. But what is the effect when the second agreement is made
with a person not a party to the first contract?
The New York conrts hold : "If the promise to perform an existing
contract does not constitute a consideration when made between the parties to the contract, we fail to see how it can become a consideration
when made with a third person.-Arend v. Smith, 151 N. Y. 502; 116 N.
Y. 40; 91 N. Y. 392. The same has been held in 68 Me. 58; 4 Ind. 612;
33 Wis. 387 ; 56 N. H. 170 ; 148 I1. 115. The contrary has been held by
the courts of Massachusetts and England.
In as much as the Pennsylvania courts hold that a second agreement
made by the original parties to a contract, by which one of them agrees
to do what he was already under contract to do, is no consideration for
additional compensation by the other party, we believe there is a like
failure of consideration when the agreement is entered into with a person
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who was not a party to the original contract. As Boyd was alfeady
under contract to move his plant to X we hold there was no consideration
tosupport the promise of McLaughlin to pay him $1,000, and he can recover
in this action.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
McLaughlin was not a party to the contract between Boyd and the
Board of Trade and, as a consequence, would not have been entitled to
sue to recover the damage which he might suffer by reason of its breach.
Boyd was bound only to the Board and if he broke his contract
nobody but the Board could recover damages. The damages which the
Board wonld have recovered may have been slight. They may have
already been liquidated at a small sum by the terms of the contract.
Tho McLaughlin was legally bound, the motive to perform the contract
may have been very slight. Furthermore the contract between Boyd and
the Board could have been rescinded by mutual consent at any time and
McLaughlin would not have had the right to object.
McLaughlin may have been much interested in Boyd's coming to X.
His coming may have meant the gain of manydollars to McLaughlin and
his not coming may have meant the loss of many dollars to McLaughlin.
McLaughlin may have desired to protect himself against this loss.
The power to claim Boyd's performance in his own right may have been
very valuable to him. Is there any reason why he should not be entitled
to secure this right and insure himself against the loss by contract ? Obviously there is none.
And if by virture of his contract McLaughlin acquired the right to
sue for the damage he would suffer by reason of Boyd's not coming to X,
certainly there was a sufficient consideration to support McLaughlin's
promise to pay $1,000. By virtue of his contract with McLaughlin, Boyd
was exposed to an additional liability,-the liability to pay damage to
McLaughlin in case he should not go to X. This damage may have been
very great.
Moreover Boyd did move to X. He did what he agreed to do, and
what, in absence of the contract with McLaughlin, he might not have
done. McLaughlin got just what he bargained for, and Boyd did whathe
otherwise might not have done, and what McLaughlin could not have
compelled him to do.
It does not appear that McLaughlin knew of Boyd's contract with
the Board, and if he contracted with Boyd in ignorance of Bo3 d's former
contract surely it would be a harsh rule which would deny McLaughlin
the right to sue for the damage which he had suffered by reason of the
breach of the latter contract. If it is decided that McLaughlin
had the right to sue on the contract, it follows that Boyd also had the
right to sue to recover the consideration which he was promised. The
obligation of contracts must be mutual. Both parties must be bound or
neither will be bound.
The cases which decide that neither the promise to do nor the actual
doing of a thing which a party is already bound by a contract to do will
constitute a consideration for an additional promise by the other party to
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the contract, do not militate against the viewwhich we have taken. In
these cases the party to whom the promise is made suffers no additional
detriment, and to allow him to recover would be to legitimize a species
of extortion.
It is held in England that a promise to perform an existing contract
with a third person or the performance of it does constitute a valuable
consideration. 9 Cyc. 354, where the cases are collected. And it has been
maintained recently by a very able American writer that in most of the
American cases the English cases were not brought to the attention of
the court, and that the latest decisions show a marked tendency toward
the English rule. Ames in 12 Harvard Law Review 520, 9 Cyc 354 See

also Pollock on Contracts 177.
Judgment reversed.

INSURANCE CO. V. RY. CO.
Practice-Insurer's Right of Subrogation-Action Must be in
the Name of the Plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
A man insured his barn in the plaintiff's company for $3,000. Through
the negligence of the Railroad Company the barn was burned; the plaintiff paid the man his claim for $3,000 and brings this action to recover
that amount from the Railroad Company.
MESSINGER for Plaintiff.
ROOKE for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
WORST, J.-This was an action by the Insurance Company against
the Railroad Company for negligence in burning a barn.
The plaintiffs claim that they have such an implied right of subrogation from the assured that they can bring this action in their own name
and that the Railroad Compauy is directly responsible to them.
The plaintiff's right against the Railroad Company accruing only
after the assured was indemnified, the only plausible reason why the Plaintiffs should sue in their own name without a formal order of subrogation is
that the assured could collect twice for his loss-the insurance premium
and damages from the wrong-doer. And the wrong-doer having paid
once for his negligence could not be made to pay the real losers-the Insurance Company-for the loss suffered. Although this theory seems equitable, the weight of authority does not support it, 11 Pa. 521 holding that
the assured may recover the entire loss, but that he holds as trustee the
amount of the indemnity received from the Insurance Company for the
use of said Insurance Company, and 3 Super Ct. 455 states: "In the
absence of express assignment subrogation is administered upon equitable
principles and may be refused if it comes in conflict with a superior equity.
As the rights of the insurer, in such case, are worked out through the
cause of action of the insured, the suit against the wrong-doer should
ordinarily be brought in the name of the insured."
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The only objections the plaintiff can make to using the name of the
assured as the nominal plaintiff are the difficulties in proving their claims
and the objection the nominal plaintiff may make. These objections are
disposed of in 150 Pa. 8; 13 W. N. C. 162 ; and 18 Pa. 86. The latter
case rules that the plaintiff for use need only show the right in the nominal plaintiff, while the second case holds that suit can be brought with or
without the consent of the nominal plaintiff.
The assured has the legal right to sue for his loss caused by the
negligence of the defendants, and the Insurance Company, only the equitable right, 3 Super, Ct. 455 and Bispham's Equity, 478. The Insurance
Company can only combine the legal with the equitable right under a
formal release from the assured. The courts recognize this formal order
of substitution to be of value. Niagara Fir&Ins. Co. v. Fidelity Co. 123
Pa. 516. In the above case the court ruled that the assured need not be
indemnified by the Insurance Company, if he refuses to release-having
covenanted to do so-his legal claim against the wrong doer, thereby
enabling the Insurance Company to sue in its own name.
No assignment of the claim having been made, the action should have
been in the name of the assured for use of the Insurance Company, 150
Pa. 15. The suit not having been so brought the plaintiff must be nonsuited, 3 Pa. D. R. 716.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
When the negligence of A causes a loss to X, the loss is generally
reimbursable by A. If the negligence causes the destruction by fire of
X's property, the possible loss is in the first instance, upon X. It may
however, ultimately fall on Y, because of Y's contract to insure the property against fire. There is therefore no reason for denying to Y the
right to sue A in his own name for the loss to him occasioned by A's
negligent act, that would not equally militate against an action by X for
the loss to him. If A's negligent act with respect to defects of or
obstructions upon the side-walk, may expose riot only him, but the borough
or city which has negligently tolerated them, to an action, and may thus
give a right of action to the borough or city in its own name against A, for
reimbursement, there is no good cause for refusing to an insurance tompany, which through its contract with the insured, is made to suffer a loss
from the negligent act of A, the right to sue A, although the owner of
the property insured may also sue him.
We are not aware however that thisview has been adopted in any of the
cases in Pennsylvania. The insurer's right of action is assumed to be a
right to sue in the name of the insured only. Kennebec Ice & Coal Co. v.
Wilmington etc. R. R. Co. 13 W. N. C. 162 ; Stoughton v. Nat. Gas Co.
165 Pa. 428; Fidelity Title etc. Co. v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co. 150 Pa. 8;
Lindsay v. Bridgewater Gas Co. 3 Dist. 716.
While, generally, the insurance company is entitled to subrogation to
the insured against the negligent causer of the fire, Ins. Co. v. Fidelity
Co., 123 Pa. 523; 150 Pa. 8, supra, it is possible for the insured to make
the money that may be ultimately received upon the insurance, inure not
to the benefit of the insurance company, but to that of the causer of the
loss, a common carrier, by the terms of the contract with such carrier.
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Roos v. R. R. Co. 199 Pa. 378. The insurer is subrogated to such rights
only, of the assured, as he has against him who is responsible for the loss.
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie etc. Transportation Co. 117 U. S. 312.
The action should have been in the name of the insured to use. The
change of the name of the plaintiff from that of the insurance company
to that of the insured, for the use of the insurance company would have
been permitted by the court, had request been made for leave to make
the change. Act May 4, 1852. Stewart's Purdon, 311; Downey v. Garard, 24 Pa. 52; Cf. Hall, v. Toby, 110 Pa. 318. But the plaintiff has
not requested a change in the name of the plaintiff, though advised of
the opinion of the court. The trial court was under no duty to make the
change nolens volens and, having, under the circumstances properly nonsuited the Plaintiff [Cf. East Union Township, v. Ryan, 86 Pa. 459]
we cannot on appeal allow the amendment, when the consequence would
be, were the amendment of any value, to oblige a reversal of a judgment,
which, when entered, was proper. Richter v. Cummings, 60 Pa. 441. It
is with reluctance that we sustain a non-suit founded on a consideration so
little pertinent to the merits.
Judgment affirmed.

SHAFER V. DANIEL.
Trespass for Malicious Prosecution-Probable Cause-Guilt of
Plaintiff as a Defence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Daniel began a prosecution of Shafer on the charge of burglary.
Shafer after being tried and acquitted for lack of evidence of his guilt,
brought this action for trespass for malicious prosecution. He alleges
that Daniel made the charges simply as a campaign trick, Shafer being at
the time a candidate for office, and without the slightest evidence of guilt.
Daniel, testifying in his own defence admits both allegations, but witnesses called by him have shown by the weight of evidence (tho not beyond a reasonable doubt) that Shafer was in fact guilty of the crime
charged, the evidence of his guilt only having been discovered since his
acquittal.
YARNALL for Plaintiff.
UMBENHAUER for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
BARNITZ, J.-' 'To put the criminal law in force maliciously, and without any reasonable or probable cause, is wrongful; and if thereby
another is prejudiced in property or person, there is that conjunction of
The law
injury and loss which is the foundation of an action .......
only renders the accuser responsible, where malice is combined with
want of probable cause." Addison on Torts v.2, p. 65.
There can be no doubt but that all the essential elements to sustain
an action for malicious prosecution are present in the case at issue, for
malice has been defined as "The doing of a wrongful act intentionally
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without just cause or excuse," 14 Am. & Eng. Encyc ; and Addison v. 2,
p. 69 says, "'Ifthe defendent appears to have put the criminal law in motion for the purpose of enforcing payment of a debt, or obtaining the
restitution of goods unlawfully detained, without having any reasonable
ground for preferring a criminal charge, there isevidence of malice."
The prosecution for burglary in the preesnt case, having been instituted as a campaign trick to jeopardize Shafer's chances of being elected
to office or to defeat him if possible, is analogous to the illustration of
Addison cited above and clearly shows the existence of malice.
The fact that Shafer was acquitted of burglary shows the want of
probable cause for that action, and indeed, Daniel has admitted in this
action against him that he had no reasonable ground for preferring the
charges against Shafer. The question we have to consider then is
whether the knowledge of the guilt of Shafer, obtained after he has been
acquitted of the charge, is a defense in this action of malicious prosecution.
Probable cause is defined to be: "A reasonableground for suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent
person in believing the party is guilty of the offence."-Sterrett, C. J., in
151 Pa. 90.
In an action for malicious prosecution the question of probable cause
should be submitted to the jury not upon the fact of the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff, but upon thc defendant's belief of his guilt or innocence. Kibert & Price, 5 W. & S. 438. The inquiry of probable cause
goes back to the commencementof the prosecution, anditrelates to facts
then known and as they then appeared. It is confined to the truth of
matters that lead to the prosecution, but extends to their appearance as
indicating the guilt or innocence of the accused. If probable cause is
shown it matters not whether the motive of the prosecutor be praiseworthy or malicious. Bryant v. Kutz, 20 Superior 102; 26 Cyc. 29 note
95.
Probable cause is quite essential to the defense in a suit for malicious prosecution, and it seems to be a recognized rule in Pennsylvania,
that the probable cause, to be used as a defense, must have exigted in
the mind of the defendant at the time of the preferring of the charge
against the plaintiff, for every public prosecution is presumed to have
been begun and carried on in good faith, and to have been founded upon
probable cause. The presence or absence of probable cause is to be determined from the circumstances appearing when the prosecution is begun
and not from the whole case as developed at the trial. Macdonald v.
Schroeder 28 Pa. Super. 131
In Natchman v. Hammer 155 Pa. 203, the defense set up was the
existence of probable cause. In support of this defense evidence was
offered to show that certain acts and declarations of the plaintiff were
communicated to the defendant about three years after the prosecution
complained of was begun, and it was held: "This evidence is clearly
incompetent for the purpose for which it appears to have been offered.
The inquiry related to the motive with which the prosecution was begun.
This does not depend on knowledge acquired three years after the act
alleged to be malicious was done." This case seems directly in point
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with the one at issue and we think, would be sufficient alone for us to
base our opinion upon.
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man
in believing that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged. The test is the prosecutor's belief of the existence of
probable cause at the time based upon reasonable grounds. The question
of probable cause relates to the inception of the prosecution. Hartman
v. Hedden 31 Pa. Super. 564. "The inquiry as to probable cause goes
back to the commencement of the prosecution and it relates to the facts
then known and as they then appeared. It is not confined to the truth
of matters which led to the prosecution but extends to their appearance
as indicating the guilt or innocence of the accused. "-Graham v. Kirchman, 168 Pa. 189.
These decisions pointing strongly to the fact that knowledge of the
guilt of the plaintiff, after his acquittal of the criminal charge, cannot
be set up as a defense in an action by him for malicious prosecution, we
shall hold that such a defense set up by Daniel in the present action cannot be sustained. Probable cause is one of the necessary elements to
the bringing of a criminal charge against a person, and, unless this probable cause exists at the commencement of the action, we can see no justification whatever for such charge being made by the prosecutor and,
without such justification, he should surely be responsible in damages for
the loss and inconvenience suffered by the accused.
Since the guilt of Shafer, discovered after his acquittal, cannot be
set up as a defense by Daniel, it is immaterial what amount of evidence
is introduced by Daniel to prove his guilt.
Judgment for Plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
That Daniel's prosecution of Shafer was without probable cause is
undoubted. He had at the time "not the slightest evidence of guilt."
That it was malicious is equally clear. It was begun, solely in order
to induce voters to v6te for a candidate who was competing with Shafer
for an office.
Until effects can be anterior to causes, the evidence discovered after
beginning a prosecution, cannot be a cause of that prosecution. Facts
discovered later may perhaps cast light on the efficiency of evidence
known at the time, to induce belief of guilt; but they cannot constitute
the cause of the institution of the criminal charge.
The only question that remains is, whether one who maliciously and
without probable cause, prosecutes another for a crime, is liable to that
other, if in facL he is guilty of that crime. We are not able to answer
this question as has the learned court of common pleas. We are aware
of no discussion of the point in any decisions in this state. It has, however been considered elsewhere.
"According to the weight of authority" says the Supreme Court of
Iowa, "the rule appears to be that if the defendant can satisfy the jury
that the plaintiff [in the action for malicious prosecution] notwithstanding his acquittal, was in fact guilty of the crime with which he was

282

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

charged, no recovery can be had." Parkhurst v. Masteller, 57 Ia. 478;
10 N. W. 866. "That the plaintiff was guilty of the offence charged is a
full answer to the action for malicious prosecution."
Whitehead v.
Ward, 12 Ala. 264. The doctrine of Ruffin, C. J. in Bell v. Pearcy, 5
Ired.83, expressed in the following words, is adopted by Lancaster v.
McKay 103 Ky. 610; "There is no doubt that a defendant in this action
may allege that the plaintiff, though acquitted in the prosecution, was actually guilty, and that he may prove the guilt by any evidence in his power,
though discovered after the prosecution began or after it ended. The
law does not give the action to a guilty man. He brings it as an innocent one, and if it appears on the trial in any way that he is not he must
fail."
Cf. also, Barber v. Gould 20 Hun. 446; Turner v. Lininger 20
Hun. 465.
The prosecutor is not a party to the prosecution. The parties thereto
are the Commonwealth and the accused. Even an acquittal therefore does
not conclude the prosecution, but, when he is sued for the causing of the
prosecution, he may show, if he can, that the defendant in the prosecution, now the plaintiff in the action for malicious prosecution-was in fact
guilty, notwithstanding his acquittal. Parkhurst v. Masteller, 57 Ia. 478;
Bell v. Pearcy, 5 Ired. 83; Newton v. Weaver, 13 R. 1. 616. [An action of
trover terminated in a verdict and judgment for the defendant. He
thereupon sued the plaintiff for malicious prosecution.
The plaintiff was allowed to defeat the action, by proving that the defendant had
been in fact guilty of the conversion.]
The accuser does not control the trial upon the indictment. The District Attorney may be dishonest or inefficient, witnesses may be eloigned
or corrupted; there may be a failure to convict, despite gailt and despite
abundant evidence of guilt. It would be a preposterous rule, that would
preclude the prosecutor when sued for malicious prosecution, to prove the
actual guilt of the plaintiff, notwithstanding an acquittal for which the
prosecutor was in no way responsible.
Nor should the acquittal be conclusive of innocence, even if it was induced by the negligence of the prosecutor or want of evidence, at the institution of the charge. It would be shocking to allow a man in fact guilty
to recover for being unsuccessfully prosecuted. The failure to convict
a guilty man would be very unsatisfactorily atoned for by rewarding
him with a few hundred or a few thousand dollars taken from the pocket
of his accuser.
No fault can be found with most of the principles enunciated by the
learned court below.
The statement that Shafer's acquittal "shows the
want of probable cause" is probably an inadvertence. Acquittal is quite
consistent with the existence of probable cause for bringing the prosecution.
The remark that "probable cause is quite essential to the defence"
is scarcely accurate. Since malice must coexist with the want of probable cause, a defence is sufficient which consists in the want of malice,
although there was likewise no probable cause. "There may be facts and
circumstances which do not amount to probable cause, but which, being
evidence of want of malice, may justify the discharge of the defendant
on the ground that there was an entire absence of malice." 26 Cyc. 23.
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In Dietz v. Langfitt, 63 Pa. 234, it was held error to say that malice or
want of probable cause would entitle the plaintiff in a suit for criminal
prosecution to recover. "The jury should instead" said Thompson C.J.
"have been instructed that malice and want of probable cause must concur and be shown, to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict." 11 P. & L. Dig.
19412.
It is necessary that the defendant should have another trial.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

SOUTHEASTERN RAILWAY CO V. ACME FIRE INSURANCE CO.

Insuranc -Stipulation in Policy as to Time of Bringing SuitMeasure of Damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Engine No. 5 of the Railroad Company was insured by the Acme
Fire Insurance Company "against direct loss or damage by fire." The
policy also provided that no action should be brought against the Insurance Company within sixty days after the proofs of the fire had been
made, and that no action should lie against the Company upon the policy
after twelve months had elapsedl "from the date of the fire."
On Feb. 25, 1908, Engine No. 5, drawing a freight train, was about
to run upon a trestle, after rounding a curve which shut off the view,
when the engineer discovered the trestle to be on fire. He applied the
air brakes and jumped. But the train ran upon the trestle which broke
through, allowing the engine to fall about twenty feet. Here fire partly
from the burning trestle, partly from that in the locomotive, damaged
the engine which had also been damaged by the fall. It was possible to
ascribe $1,000 of the damage to the fire alone and $1,000 to the fall alone,
but as to $3,000 it was not possible to separate the loss and apportion it
to the two causes. The Insurance Company offered to pay half of this
amount in addition to the $1,000 caused entirely by fire. The Railroad
Company refused this offer, and on Mar. 3, 1906, brought suit for the full
amount of the loss.
The proofs of the fire and loss had been very promptly made. At
the trial the court was asked to grant a non-suit, but refused. This refusal is now alleged as error in an appeal of the case by the Insurance
Company. The Insurance Company had tendered the Railroad Company
$2,50D before the case came to trial and professed throughout a willingness to pay this amount.
MOYER for P aintiff.
COHEN for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT:
FETTERHOOF J. -This policy of insurance issued by the Acme Fire Insurance Company set out in explicit terms that no action should lie against
the company upon the policy after twelve months had elapsed "from the
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date of the fire." That the company had the right to make such a condition in the contract which would be binding cannot be disputed. A stipulation in a contract that action shall not be brought within a certain time is
valid and binding. North Western Insurance Co. v. Phoenix Oil & Candle
Co. 31 Pa. 449.
A condition in a policy of fire insurance that no action against the insurers for the recovery of any claim upon the policy shall be sustained
unless commenced within twelve months after the loss shall have occurred
and that the lapse of this period shall be conclusive evidence against the
validity of any claim asserted, if an action for its enforcement be subsequently commenced is not against the policy of the Statute of Limitation
and is valid. Farmer's Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Barr 94 Pa. 345; Universal Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Weiss Bros. 106 Pa. 20; Moone v. The
State Ins. Co. 72 Iowa 414; Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co. 51 Conn. 17;
Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co. 7 Wallace 389.
Like any other condition of the policy this limitation upon the right
to bring an action may be waived by the insurers. Any contract on his
part by which he knowingly induced the insured to postpone bringing
action in the hope of a promised settlement will estop the insurer to
claim the benefit of the condition. Thompson v. Ins. Co. 136 U. S. 287;
Bish v. Ins. Co. 69 Iowa 184; Mickey v. Ins. Co. 35 Iowa 174. The
court says in the latter case, "It would be contrary to justice for the
Insurance Company to hold out the hope of an amicable adjustment of
the loss, and thus delay the action of the insured, and then be permitted to
plead this very delay, caused by its course of conduct, as a defense to
the action when brought."
An insurance company may waive expressly or impliedly a compliance with any condition of a policy to be performed and observed by the
insured. The condition is inserted in the policy for the benefit of the insurer and hence there is nothing to prevent the company from waiving
it whenever it may desire. Bush v. Hartford Ins. Co. 222 Pa. 419;
Coursin v. Ins. Co. 46 Pa. 353.
Taking this case in the light of the above authorities, it has in it a
valid subsisting condition, which unless waived by the Insurance Company furnishes an absolute defence against the Railroad Company. The
loss or damage by fire occurred on Feb. 25, 1908, and action was brought
for the full amount of the loss March 3, 1909, one year seven days after
the loss. The principal question then is, has there been such a waiver on
the part of the Insurance Company as will allow the Railroad Company
to recover ? While the facts are very brief and much argument might
be advanced on both sides yet we are inclined to believe there has been
a waiver and on that assumption base our decision. The Insurance Company offered to pay $1,506 in addition to the $1,000 loss caused entirely
by fire. But when the offer was first made does not appear. Can we
not with propriety assume that there was a course of dealing between
the Insurance Company and the Railroad Company w..ich fully led to the
belief on the part of the latter that an amicable settlement would be
made ? The very fact that action was commenced but seven days after
the time had elapsed, as provided in the policy, within which the action
was to be brought might be taken as one of the circumstances tending
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to show that negotations had taken place and that'as soon as the Railroad Company received a definite, conclusive answer that so much would
be paid and no more, action was brought. Surely a corporation such as
the South Eastern Railroad Company which no doubt holds insurance to
the amount of thousands of dollars knew that the condition was binding,
yet by a course of dealing with the Insurance Company by trying to obtain a settlement, extending over possibly months, the Railroad Company
was made to think the loss would be adjusted in due time to the full
satisfaction of all concerned. The fact that the Insurance Company professed throughout the trial a willingness to pay $2,500 does not alter the
situation. They of course would prefer to pay this amount rather than
allow the case to go to the jury and run the risk of having a verdict for
the full amount $5,000 entered against them.
In Bennett v. Insurance Company 129 Pa. 558 the testimony showed
that proofs of loss were furnished within the time prescribed; that all
the plaintiff's books and papers were promptly presented on defendants
demands; that adjustment was delayed by the Company upon various
pretexts, and that after the limitation expired the Company offered to
adjust the loss upon the receipt of other books and papers demanded.
The question whether or not the limitation as to time had been waived
by the Company was held to be one for the jury, it being held error to
grant a non-suit. These cases are in many respects analogous. Proof of
the fire and loss had been promptly made and an offer tendered which
prolonged the adjustment of the loss. Why should the plaintiff commence suit when negotiations were going on ? Good faith required that
plaintiff should have had a plain yes or no, for an answer to the demand
of payment, and that such an answer should be given before the expiration of the limitation.
As was said by Mr. Justice Gordon in Penna. Fire Ins. Co., v. Doughtery 102 Pa. 568. "Primafacie the insured is entitled to have his loss
made good immediately upon its happening, and when the loss appears
to be an honest one we are not disposed to scan very strictly the evidence
which tends to rebut a technical forfeiture of the right to payment."
Since the Insurance Company by their own conduct have waived the
condition as to time within which the action is to be brought, it remains
to be seen how much damages the Railroad Company is entitled to recover.
A contract of insurance is one of indemnity against actual loss or
damages by fire. The terms of this contract were "against direct loss
or damage by fire." Then the loss by fire was found to be $1,000, to the
fall alone $1,000, and $3,000 which it was not possible to separate and
apportion to the two causes, making a total loss of $5,000.
In applying the doctrine of proximate cause to the law of Insurance,
to quote the language of Mr. Justice Strong in a leading case 94 U. S. 469.
"The question always is, was there an unbroken connection between the
wrongful act and the injury, -a continuous operation? Did the facts constitute a continuous succession of events so linked together as to make a
natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause intervening
between the wrong and the injury? " The application of this rule may
well be illustrated by two leading cases.
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In Lynn Gas and Electricity Co. v. Mendeni Fire Ins. Co. 158 Mass.
570, the policy insured the building and machinery of the insured
against loss or damage by fire. A fire occurred in the tower, situate
some distance from the building in which the dynamos and other electrical machinery of the insured were placed. By reason of the burning of
the wire tower a short circuit was formed. This caused a sudden increase
of pressure upon the driving belt of the dynamo, which parted and left
the engine without restraint. The fly wheel, thus caused to revolve too
fast, burst and wrecked the machinery and building. It was contended
that the loss to the machinery and the building was too remote to be
covered by the insurance against fire. But the court held that there was
an unbroken chain of causation between the fire in the tower and the
wrecking of the building and machinery, and therefore held the insurer
liable as for damage by fire.
In the second case Ermentrout v. Girard Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
63 Minn. 305, 30 L. R. A. 346, the building of the insured was damaged
by the falling of the wall of an adjacent house, which was on fire. No
part of the insured building was actually burnt, but the court held that
the damage suffered by the insured was due diree ly to the falling of the
wall of the adjacent building, which was, in turn, caused by fire.
It has also been held that these damages include not only damages
done by actual ignition, but also such as result from charring, scorching, smoke, water used in quenching the fire, or from the hasty efforts
to remove the goods insured to a place of safety. Independent Mutual
Co. v. Agnew 34 Pa. 99; Scripture v. Ins. Co., 10 Cushing 356.
The trestle being on fire was unable to withstand the weight of the
engine in passing over it and in consequence of this the engine fell through,
being damaged in all to the extent of $5,000. The policy providing for
this loss or damage by fire clearly covers this loss. The damages amounting to $3,000 which cannot be apportioned are the direct result of the fire
and are not too remote.
In view of the conclusion reached the judgment of the lower court in
refusing to deny a recovery by the plaintiff is affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The first question to which we shall give attention, is that of the limitation of the time of suit. The policy forbids suit within sixty days
after proof of loss, and beyond one year "from the date of the fire."
It is too late to challenge the validity of provisions for suit within a time
less than that time prescribed by the statute of limitations of the
state, provided that they are otherwise reasonable. A requirement of
suit within 12 months of the time has been held reasonable, 4 Cooley
Briefs on the Law of Insurance, 3965. Waite v. Ins. Co. 1 W. N. C. 155.
The period of six months has been held reasonable, by some courts-4
Cooley, 3966; Ins. Co. v. Stuart 3 Penny. 536; Bonnert v. Ins. Co. 129 Pa.
558; Ins. Co. v. Oil and Candle Co., 31 Pa. 448.
The fire occurred February 25th, 1908, and the suit was commenced
March 3d, 1909. It was too late unless we find some other date than
that of the fire to be the initial point, or unless there has been a waiver
by the company of the stipulation in question. Occasionally courts have
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found that the day of the loss is to be discarded, for the point of inception of the limitation in favor of the day when, by proof of loss, orby
lapse of the period within which suit is prohibited, the right of action
becomes complete. In Steen v. Ins. Co., 89 N. Y. 315, the policy required suit to be brought within 12 months "next after the loss or damage shall occur." The court concluded as a matter of interpretation,
that the policy meant, next after the time when suit could have been
brought. It observes, however, "No doubt the appellant [the company]
would have stipulated that the time of the fire should be looked to as the
event, from the happening of which the limitation should run; but", it
adds, "it would require distinct language to show that such was the intention of the parties." It thus concedes that the intention of the parties is decisive. The policy before us forbids suit to be begun after 12
months have elapsed "from the date of the fire." If more explicit expression of the intention to limit the suit to 12 months after the fire, could
have been invented by the parties, we are unfortunately ignorant as to
what it could be. We think that the suit should have been bronght within
one year after the fire unless there has been a waiver by the company of
their duty.
Has the company done any thing to waive this duty on the part of
the insured? It has not expressly waived. We are told that a dispute
arose as to the amount for which the company was liable. The company
offered to pay $2500. The insured demanding $5,000 refused this offer.
We are not told when this refusal took place, nor how long the negotiations lasted. Did it last a week or day? Was it concluded before March
3d, 1908, or after? For all that appears, a full year may have passed
since the final breach of negotiations before the suit was commenced.
If that was so it would be difficult to find a waiver. The proof of loss
had been very promptly made. Possibly the differences between the
parties had manifestly become irreconcilable before March 3d, 1908.
We are not willing to concede that the institution of a colloquy between the insured and the insurer, with a view to a non-litigious settlement, ipso facto deletes and abolishes the stipulation concerning the time
of bringing suit. In Warner v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 1 Walker, 315,
the plaintiff was non-suited for not bringing suit within the year after
the loss, although there had been negotiations between the parties for a
settlement. The Supreme Court thought the delay "an unanswerable
objection to any recovery upon the policy."
Waiver is a matter of intention of the insurer, either actual or imputable. If it reasonably causes the insured to believe that it intends not
to insist on the provision for prompt suit, the waiver will exist as much
as if the intention to dispense with the promises actually existed. But
there is absolutely nothing before us to indicate that the insurer intended, or that the insured reasonably inferred that it intended to dispense with the requirement of suit within the year. The court below
might well have granted a non-suit, for there was not enough before
the jury to warrant the inference of a waiver. The case was devoid
of facts similar to those in Bonnert v. Ins. Co. 129 Pa. 558.
The next question concerns the amount of loss for which under the
policy, the defendant became liable. The plaintiff was insured against
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"direct loss or damage by fire" to the engine. The locality of the fire
is not defined. it might occur within the house in which the engine
might be stored over night, etc., or anywhere upon the tracks of the
railroad company.
The fire was not defined as that of the property of the defendant.
Had the engines been in a building belonging to another, and been
injured by the conflagration of that building the injury would have
been within the provisions of the policy. The fire was that of a bridge
upon which the engine was running. Injury to the engine caused by the
fire was covered by the policy. The fire of the bridge caused injury to
the locomotive, The fire of the bridge caused the fire of the engine to
injure it. But, this latter injury is a "direct loss or damage by fire."
These words "include not only the destruction which results from the
actual combustion of the property, but, in the absence of special stipulations even, also all damage which is the direct and natural result of
a hostile fire." 4 Cooley, Briefs on the Law of 'Ins. 3018. The fall of a
building; injuries from the use of water in extinguishing the fire; injury
for the removal of goods from the burning building; loss by theft, consequent on the confusion attending the fire; Ins. Co. v. Agnew, 34 Pa.
96: [Cf. Hillier v. Ins. Co., 3 Pa. 470]; 9 P. & L. Dig. 14784, are covered by the policy. A loss to goods in a house from smoke and soot,
emanating from a coal oil stove, the oil in which took fire, is covered
by the words "direct cause or damage by fire;" Collins v. Ins. Co., 9
Super. 576. The fire sent forth the soot; the soot injured the goods.
Cf. May. v Ins. Co, 166 Mass. 67.
The fire of the bridge caused the fall of the engine. Its fall caused
injury to it. This injury is the direct result of the fire. The fire wrecks
the bridge; this weakness causes the precipitation of the engine; the
concussion of the engine with the water, or the soil below the water,
breaks or otherwise injures the engine. This surely is as direct a result
as the loss by theft of goods during the fire, or the loss by water or
chemicals. Had a heavy article fallen from the second story of a house,
in consequence of the burning of the floor, and been injured by the
fall, though not itself at all burnt, surely the injury would be within
the intent of the policy, If the policy covers property destroyed by an
explosion in order to prevent the fire's spreading, Greenauld v. Ins. Co.
3 Phila. 323; if it covers the destruction of the roof by an explosion of
gunpowder caused by a fire, although the roof is not burnt, Scripture v.
Ins. Co. 10 Cush. 356; we see no reason for doubting that it covers the damage to a heavy article caused by its fall, which fall is caused by the
combustion of the bridge or other support, upon which it depends for
avoidance of a fall. Cf. also Electricity Co. v. Meridian Ins. Co., 158
Mass. 570, and Ermentrout v. Ins. Co. 63 Minn. 305; 30 L. R. A. 346,
cited by the learned court below.
The opinion of the court below is commendable for its lucidity and
thoroughness. We are however unable to find on the facts proved sufficient to justify the submission to the jury of a waiver of the stipulation which requires suits to be brought within twelve months after the
fire. The trial court should have given binding instructions to the jury
to find a verdict for the defendant.

